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The Relation of ideological Self-Placement and EU Support in 2017.
How does Left-Right Placement structure Support for the European Union in 
the EU28 and for which part of the political Spectrum is it most controversial?
Abstract
The relation of left-right self-placement and EU support seems to have become more linear again in
the previous years. After a rise of euroscepticism at both ends of the spectrum, the left has now
become even more supportive than  the center.  The variance in  attitudes  towards  the  EU is,  in
contrast to expectations, higher on the right than on the left. 
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1.0 Introduction
As a topic crucial for the legitimacy of further european integration, public support for the
European Union and euroscepticism have been researched extensively by scholars worldwide,
asking  to  find  explanations  and conditions  for  public  support  as  well  as  researching  the
distribution of support or euroscepticism across other characteristics. This empirical study
falls  in  the  latter category,  examining  the  ever-changing  relation  to  political  left-right
ideology.  In my theoretical  section,  I  will  first  summarize the concepts  of public  support
towards a political object, its relation to EU studies, the concept of euroscepticism and how
they relate. Then I will give an overview on explanations of EU support before focussing on
the relation of left-right ideology and support/euroscepticism. A description of the used data,
the operationalizations and an explanation of the statistical  models follow in the data and
methodology section, preceding the empirical results. Finally, I will discuss the results. 
This  paper  will  set  some  expectations  to  the  examined  relation  and  will  present  some
explanations, but wont examine the causal relationship in depth, because there are so many
factors working, some of them might interact or have the same causes, which would made
modeling very complex. So, this paper just shows general trends and tries to explain these, but
does  not  aim to  explain  support  on  the  individual  level.  Nevertheless,  since  the  relation
between left-right self-placement and attitudes towards the European Union does not remain
constant, but is constantly changing  (van Elsas and van der Brug 2015), and  publications
about the current relation in the last years do not exist, this paper aims to fill this gap using
Eurobarometer data from may 2017. The latest studies I found uses data from 2014 and before
(van Elsas et al. 2016), the last study showing the relation for the complete political spectrum,
and not focussing on the extremes, is showing the relation from 2010 (van Elsas and van der
Brug 2015), at the heart of the economic crisis. The effect of the reconsolidation after the euro
crisis in the last years has not been shown yet. I consider it possible, that the development of
the last years, the normalization of the economic situation of the euro zone, the annexion of
the Crimea through Russia  and the election of  Donald Trump as  President  of the United
States, as well as current efforts of the European Union might have influenced the relation
between left-right ideology and support for european integration and changed it again. 
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2.0 Theory
2.1 Public Support and Euroscepticism
Support refers to an evaluation an actor concludes for himself towards an object.  Based on
this  evaluation,  the  actor  develops  attitudes  regarding  the  entity.  Support  consists  of  the
attitudes, either positive or negative, towards the object and the behavior resulting from these
attitudes. Public support for political systems can be divided into specific and diffuse support.
Specific support relates to the satisfaction with the outputs of the political system and the
perceived performance of the systems political authorities. Specific support is object-specific
towards  the  current  political  authorities  and  their  perceived  decisions,  policies,  actions,
utterances or general style. Diffuse support relies on the importance the political system has to
the actor for what it is rather than what it does. The actor evaluates the political system itself.
The consequences of (positive) diffuse support are trust in the political system and a belief in
the legitimacy of  the  system,  or  even  identification  with  the  political  construct.  Diffuse
Support is constitued through socialization and experience. Some origins of diffuse support
relevant to this study are political orientations and ideological commitments, which can set a
framework and provide orientation  for the evaluation of a political object. There might be
spill-over-effects too. When an actor is developing political attitudes towards objects, which
are  often  linked  with  specific  attitudes  towards  another  object,  he  might  take  on  these
attitudes  as  well.  Because  diffuse  support  is  more  fundamental,  it  is  more  durable  than
specific support. Positive diffuse support consists of attitudes towards a political object, which
help the actor to accept outputs he is opposed to, because the actor evaluates the general
process the decision was made positively. Specific support may vary with different policies or
authorities,  while  diffuse  support  remains constant.  But  specific  and  diffuse  support  are
linked.  When specific  support  is  low for  a  longer  period  of  time,  it  might  influence  the
evaluation of the whole system, when the process of policy-making or inauguration of the
political authorities is considered to be (partly) responsible for unfavourable outputs. Since
diffuse support is more durable than specific support, it  also takes more time to  establish
when it is or has gone low (Easton 1965, 1975).
Scholars researching public support of the European Union and european integration have
adapted this  distinction.  While specific support is  called policy support and relates to the
support of the content of collective decisions and actions taken by EU actors, diffuse support
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is labelled regime support. Regime support refers to the constitutional setting of the Union
and the actors perception of the EU membership of his country. As the European Union has
increased its competences and integration has depened and widened, further integration as
well as the status quo became much more dependent on public support. Regime support is
crucial  for  maintaining  legitimacy  in  times  of  low  policy  support,  in  order  to  maintain
previous achievements (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Scepticism towards european integration
is  often  referred  to  as  euroscepticism  (e.g.  Hooghe 2007;  Boomgarden  et  al.  2011).  The
concept  of  euroscepticism  can  be  divided  into  ‘hard‘  and  ‚soft‘  euroscepticism.  Hard
euroscepticism refers  to  general  opposition  towards  the  european  project  or  the  EU,  for
example  the  belief,  that  the  European  Union  in  its  current  institutional  structure  is
malfunctioning and not repairable. Soft euroscepticism refers to criticism of the institutional
constituition or parts of it, or to unfavoured developments in certain (policy) areas, without
general opposition towards european integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). While hard
euroscepticism is  syonymous with negative  regime support,  soft  euroscepticism might  be
more close to negative policy support. 
2.2 Explanations of EU Support
In  their  2016  review of  the  literature  about  public  support  for  european  integration  and
euroscepticism, Hobolt and de Vries examine three main approaches for explaining support
for the EU on the individual level (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). The first basic approach is a
utalitarian approach, which assumes, that a person, a group or a nation state will favour EU
membership and further integration, if the person, group or state will profit from it or if it is in
line with their preferences. For example, better educated, high-skilled workers will favour
integration more than lower skilled workers, because they are better prepared to compete in a
common  market  (Gabel  and  Palmer  1995).  But  benefits  do  not  have  to  be  restricted  to
financial aspects. Garry and Tilley (2015) found empirical evidence, that people on the left are
less  supportive towards european integration in  countries  with extensive welfare systems,
fearing that economic integration might lead to a liberalization, while in countries with less
state intervention, people on the left hope, the policies for the common market might lead to
more redistribution. 
The second approach considers personal or collective identity influential in the evaluation of
the  EU. Since the  EU evolved to  a  multi-level  polity,  more  and more  policy  areas  were
                                                                                                                                                  4
integrated, which threatens national sovereignity and national self-determination.  Therefor,
people with a stronger attachment to their country and people identifying strongly with their
nation state tend to be more eurosceptic  (Hooghe and Marks 2005). More restrictive views
regarding immigration and and a general hostility towards minority groups and other cultures
in general cause lower levels of support for the EU too. Support for integration is lower, when
people perceive it as a ‘cultural threat‘ (McLaren 2002).
Last, we will consider the effects of cues and benchmarking. The core argument of cue-taking
approaches is, that the EU is too complex and too distant  from their  daily lives for most
citizens to evaluate the EU by themselves regarding their preferences and benefits, so they
rely on proxies for their evaluation (Anderson 1998). The most important proxies are political
parties  and media.  Supporters  of  national  parties  tend to  follow their  parties  position  on
european integration  (e.g.  Hooghe and Marks 2005). The media has an effect on support,
because it provides the information needed for the individual evaluation. The current news are
salient  to  the  recipients,  so  attitudes  towards  the  EU  are  influenced  by  the  news  media
because  the  the  salient  information  are  taken into  account  for  the  evaluation  of  the  EU.
Especially because the media often  shifts focus to  different  topics over  time, so different
topics dominate public opinion at specific times. But there are long-term effects of media
content measurable as well (Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Vliegenthart et al. 2008). But the
evaluations of the EU and its institutions are influenced through benchmarks as well.  For
example, when european institutions perform better than national ones, support tends to be
higher and the other way around. National contexts so provide a heuristic for the evaluation of
efficiency and performance (Anderson 1998; Kritzinger 2003). Cue-taking and benchmarking
espacially stress the importance of national contexts for public support. 
2.3 Left-Right Placement as a Predictor of EU Support
The  left-right  dimension  is  traditionally  based  on  socioeconomic  attitudes,  especially
regarding attitudes on redistribution. While voters and parties considering themselves to be on
the right favour market liberalization and oppose state intervention, voters and parties on the
left favour more market regulations and redistribution. But at the same time, the left-right
dimension concerns socio-cultural issues as well. While the right represents conservatives in
general, nation-state and national culture are typically emphasized. On the left, the concept of
international solidarity has a long history. Feminism and environmentalism were integrated in
                                                                                                                                                  5
the last century. The socio-cultural dimension has become more important for the left-right
self-placement of voters and parties, espacially issues like national identity, immigration and
multiulturalism.  On  the  socio-cultural  dimension,  the  right  typically  wants  to  constrain
immigration and preserve  national identity  and sovereignity.  In contrast,  the left  proposes
multiculturalism (de Vries et al. 2013; Lefkofridi et al. 2014). 
If the left-right dimension can structure support for european integration, or its counterpart
euroscepticism,  has  been asked numerous times,  aiming to structure positions  of  national
parties (Ray 1999; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002; Hooghe et al. 2002; Statham and Koopmans
2009; Marks et al. 2011; Miklin 2014), or of the mass public (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2005;
Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Garry and Tilley 2015; van Elsas and van der Brug 2015; van
Elsas et al. 2016). Although results are mixed. Van Elsas and van der Brug (2015) explain the
contradictory results in their long term analysis through changes in the relation of ideology
and support. In the beginning, european integration was mainly market integration, which was
opposed by people on the left  because they feared market liberalization and welfare state
dilution.  But  after  the  signing  of  the  Maastricht  treaty,  euroscepticism rose  on  the  right,
because  the  now  formed  European  Union  evolved  into  a  more  complex,  multi-issue
supranational  polity,  reducing  national  self-determination and  sovereignity.  But
euroscepticism on the left and on the right did not follow each other, they coexisted, creating a
U-shaped relation between left-right ideology and euroscepticism. While the center was most
supportive, eurosepticism was found mainly at both ends of the political spectrum. After the
euro crisis, the left opposed austerity policies and the neoliberal crisis managment in general.
The right opposed immigration. But nationalism seems not to be only an issue on right side of
the  political  spectrum.  Opposition  to  integration  in  political  parties  on  the  left  is  indeed
concerned about the nation-state as well, leaving nationalism the common denominator for
euroscepticism across political ideology. But nationalism on the right is more ethno-cultural
oriented, while nationalism on the left refers to the nation state as ‘preventor of and for the
popular  classes’  (Halikiopoulou  et  al.  2012).  Second,  parties  on  the  extremes  use
euroscepticism to  differentiate themselves from the established parties and to get attention
(Taggart  1998).  These  party  positions  might  influence  their  supporters,  structuring  public
opinion  indirectly  through  party  cues.  While the  relation  of  EU support  and  ideology  is
changing over time, this paper will look into its structure at the time the data was collected.
Van Elsas et al. (2016) pointed out, that people on the right tend to reject the EU completely,
while people on the left are not opposed to integration  in principle, but are dissatisfied. If
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there is a change of the relation, I would expect it  to be caused by changing attitudes of
people in left part of the political spectrum. Since the right opposes the EU more in principle,
changes on the right side are less likely and slower.
Secondly, I want to know, on which side the attitudes are more diverse, where the topic is
more controversial. On the right, I consider the loss of national sovereignity and the fear of
immigration  the  major  concern regarding the  EU. On the left,  however,  I  expect  a  more
diverse picture, because the left seems more fragmented in its party structures, its goals and
areas of focus. For example, the fear of welfare state dilution depends on the national context.
In liberal countries, leftists support integration hoping for european economic policies being
less liberal than the ones of their national governments (Garry and Tilley 2015). On the left,
there are multiple areas people and parties can focus on, the positions considered as left have
broadened. The left might include green and liberal parties. For example, supporters of green
parties might favour integration because of advances in the field of environment policies,
while alternatives and liberals promote multiculturalism. And the left has a history promoting
international solidarity, with european solidarity and multilateralism being a step in the right
direction. My expectation is, that the right is more concerned with national identity than with
market liberalization, which leads to less support and more scepticism towards the European
Union throughout the right, while the left is more fragmented. 
3.0 Data and Methodology
I am using the data from the Eurobarometer 87.3 survey data, which were collected in May
2017  (European Comission 2017).  Left-right position is measured by a self-placement on a
scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being the extreme left and 10 the extreme right2. For the analyses, a
recoded version of this scale was used as well as three categorial variables representing the
left, the center and the right. The center category summed the response categories 5 and 6.
Although most respondents perceive 5 as the exact center, it is actually 5.5.  Scales ranging
from 1 to 10 have an even number of categories, so people would have to choose, if they are a
bit left or right from the center. But most are unaware of this, which poses a methodological
problem in the use of these scales. The category for the left represents 4 and lower of the
original scale, the categorial variable for the right includes 7 and higher. The left-right scale
2 Variable d1: „In political matters people talk about „the left“ and „the right“ How would 
you place your views on this scale?. Left 1 – 10 Right“
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was recoded to set the center to 0, so the scale is ranging from -4.5 to 4.5. To test a curvilinear
relation using a regression, I squared the recoded left-right scale. Van Elsas and van der Brug
(2015) constructed  their  curvilinear  model  the  exact  same  way.  I  defined  an  extremism
variable ranging from 0 to 4 by setting 5 and 6 of the original left-right scale to 0, 4 and 7 to
1,  etc.  To get a  more  detailed  picture  of  the  respondents  attitudes  towards  the  European
Union, two dependent variables were used. The first one asks about the impression the person
has  of the EU3. This may concern elements both of regime support and policy support. The
second question refers to the general position on EU membership, so to regime support. The
respondents are asked, if they agree to the statement, that their country could face the future
better outside of the EU4. For both variables, I tested a linear and curvilinear model based on
the  left-right  scale  and  a  linear  model  using  the  extremism variable  as  the  predictor  to
describe the general relationship between political ideology and support. Because the relation
of extremism and EU support might differ between left and right, I calculated regressions with
variables ranging from moderately left/right to extremely left/right. To answer the question, if
the variance in the attitudes are higher on the left than on the right, I interpreted the standard
errors of dummy regressions for both variables using the categorial variables for the left, the
center  and  the  right  as  independent  factors.  The  center  category  was  the  reference.  All
regressions were weightened to adjust the country samples to population size, making the
sample representative for the EU285. Since this paper does not aim to find causalities, no
control  variables  were  added.  All  regression  models  use  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)
regressions and were done using R 3.2.3 on Linux. All used functions are part of the base or
the statistics package of the basic version. The R script is available in the appendix.
4.0 Results
For both dependent variables, the linear left-right regression provided the best fit of all three
models (Adjusted R²: 0.009795; 0.02537)6. The model using the extremism variable had the
3 Variable qa9a: „In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
fairly negative or very negative image?“
4 Variable qa18a_5: „Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. […] (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU: 
Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree.“
5 Variable w23: EU28 from 2014 to 2019
6 See R Outputs in the Appendix: 6A, 6B
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smallest  R²  for  both  variables  (0.004129;  0.004313)7,  followed  by  the  curvilinear  model
(0.005217; 0.006123)8. All tested models were highly significant. People on the left have a
more positive image of the EU and tend to disagree more to the statement, that their country
could face the future better outside the EU. Within the left, there is no significant difference in
the image of the EU, the extreme left does neither have a more negative image, nor a more
positive.  The extreme left  are even slightly more disagreeing that their  country would be
better off outside the EU than the moderate left9. Within the  right of the political spectrum,
being extreme is  related to having a negative image of the EU and the attitude that their
country could be better off outside the EU in the future10. 
In the dummy regressions, the general trend is observable as well. The lowest variation in
attitudes consisted in the center, with the left and the right both having considerably higher
standard errors for both variables. But against expectations, the standard errors are slightly
higher on the right than on the left11.
5.0 Discussion
The general structure of support for european integration seems to have become more linear
again, with right-wing citizens being more eurosceptic. While I argued, that it is more likely
to find change on the left than on the right, it does not explain why people on the left seem to
be more satisfied with the EU and therefor more supportive than a few years ago. Maybe the
‘neoliberal character’ of the EU has lost its salience due to the recovery of the EU after the
euro crisis. Or they conceive the EU necessary to regulate modern international capitalism, to
prevent and manage large economic crises and to fight for citizens rights. The efforts against
tax  paradises  and  tax  evasions  of  large  international  companies,  or  for  data  security  and
privacy might also contribute to this change. Additionally, the nationalistic agenda of Donald
Trump,  for  example  his  threat  to  withdraw  from  the  Paris  agreement12,  may  set  a  new
7 Outputs 2A, 2B
8 Outputs 3A, 3B
9 Outputs 4A, 4B
10 Outputs 5A, 5B
11 Outputs 1A, 2B
12 Trump declared the rejection after the survey was conducted (Shear 2017).
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benchmark for the evaluation of domestic and european politics. Although these might be
possible explanations, this development would need an in-depth analysis of its own.
The other main result of my study is, that the attitudes are more diverse on the right than on
the left. This might be caused by the definition of the dummy variables. While there is a lot of
scepticism at the extreme right, the moderate right is far more supportive, as shown by the
regression  of  only  the  right  side  of  the  political  spectrum.  The  moderate  right  might  be
relatively  happy  with  the  EU policies  and  does  support  further  integration.  Because  my
definition  of  the  right  does  include  the  moderate  right,  there  might  be  a  lot  of  people
supporting integration and and a lot who do not, which leads to a high standard error for the
dummy  regression.  Nevertheless,  EU  support  might  be  more  controversial  on  the  right,
because they have to trade off between the two opposing goods national self-determination
and market integration, which are both important to people on the right. 
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Appendix 
Complete R Outputs
Dummy Regressions
1A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ right_dummy + left_dummy, 
    weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.3540 -0.4229  0.0000  0.2510  7.3799 
Labels:
 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)  2.72356    0.00955  285.19  < 2e-16 ***
right_dummy  0.22772    0.01618   14.08  < 2e-16 ***
left_dummy  -0.04330    0.01453   -2.98  0.00288 ** 
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9447 on 22234 degrees of freedom
  (7031 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.01253, Adjusted R-squared:  0.01244 
F-statistic:   141 on 2 and 22234 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
1B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ right_dummy + left_dummy, 
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    weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-6.2909 -0.4484  0.0427  0.5635  4.4276 
Labels:
 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)  2.94052    0.01076 273.240   <2e-16 ***
right_dummy -0.30629    0.01814 -16.886   <2e-16 ***
left_dummy   0.14126    0.01620   8.721   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.02 on 20711 degrees of freedom
  (12466 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.02656, Adjusted R-squared:  0.02647 
F-statistic: 282.6 on 2 and 20711 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
Regressions
2A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ extremism, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.3053 -0.4216  0.0000  0.2456  7.4308 
Labels:
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 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) 2.707860   0.008476 319.487   <2e-16 ***
extremism   0.046325   0.004799   9.654   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9487 on 22235 degrees of freedom
  (7031 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.004174, Adjusted R-squared:  0.004129 
F-statistic:  93.2 on 1 and 22235 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
3A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ leftright_sq, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.3260 -0.4179  0.0000  0.2475  7.4092 
Labels:
 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
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(Intercept)  2.711757   0.007856  345.17   <2e-16 ***
leftright_sq 0.011117   0.001025   10.85   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9482 on 22235 degrees of freedom
  (7031 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.005262, Adjusted R-squared:  0.005217 
F-statistic: 117.6 on 1 and 22235 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
4A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ left, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-4.8460 -0.4012  0.0000  0.2992  7.4691 
Labels:
 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) 2.693837   0.012102 222.597   <2e-16 ***
left        0.004429   0.005969   0.742    0.458    
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9346 on 14012 degrees of freedom
  (16777 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  3.929e-05, Adjusted R-squared:  -3.207e-05 
F-statistic: 0.5506 on 1 and 14012 DF,  p-value: 0.4581
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5A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ right, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-4.3725 -0.4758  0.0000  0.0959  5.8712 
Labels:
 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)  2.71606    0.03264   83.21  < 2e-16 ***
right        0.09217    0.01167    7.90 3.31e-15 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.9677 on 5790 degrees of freedom
  (26171 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.01066, Adjusted R-squared:  0.01049 
F-statistic: 62.41 on 1 and 5790 DF,  p-value: 3.308e-15
6A
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ leftright, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.5956 -0.4188  0.0000  0.2485  7.2728 
Labels:
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 value           label
     1   Very positive
     2 Fairly positive
     3         Neutral
     4 Fairly negative
     5   Very negative
     6              DK
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) 2.778958   0.006410  433.50   <2e-16 ***
leftright   0.044699   0.003007   14.87   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.946 on 22235 degrees of freedom
  (7031 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.00984, Adjusted R-squared:  0.009795 
F-statistic:   221 on 1 and 22235 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
2B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ extremism, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-6.4130 -0.4791  0.0477  0.5323  3.4797 
Labels:
 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
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(Intercept)  2.978178   0.009589 310.586   <2e-16 ***
extremism   -0.051545   0.005412  -9.524   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.031 on 20712 degrees of freedom
  (12466 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.004361, Adjusted R-squared:  0.004313 
F-statistic: 90.71 on 1 and 20712 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
3B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ leftright_sq, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-6.3985 -0.4717  0.0427  0.5359  3.4969 
Labels:
 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)   2.976983   0.008865  335.80   <2e-16 ***
leftright_sq -0.013099   0.001155  -11.34   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.03 on 20712 degrees of freedom
  (12466 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.006171, Adjusted R-squared:  0.006123 
F-statistic: 128.6 on 1 and 20712 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
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4B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ left, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-6.1238 -0.4631 -0.0032  0.5408  3.2334 
Labels:
 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) 2.993901   0.013669 219.036  < 2e-16 ***
left        0.017407   0.006702   2.597  0.00941 ** 
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.017 on 13051 degrees of freedom
  (20127 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.0005166, Adjusted R-squared:  0.00044 
F-statistic: 6.745 on 1 and 13051 DF,  p-value: 0.009409
5B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ right, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.8328 -0.4157  0.2096  0.6116  4.0525 
Labels:
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 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)  3.03650    0.03559   85.31   <2e-16 ***
right       -0.15819    0.01277  -12.39   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.018 on 5413 degrees of freedom
  (27765 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.02757, Adjusted R-squared:  0.02739 
F-statistic: 153.5 on 1 and 5413 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
6B
Call:
lm(formula = Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ leftright, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)
Weighted Residuals:
<Labelled double>
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
-5.9892 -0.4591  0.0636  0.5472  3.9890 
Labels:
 value                 label
     1         Totally agree
     2         Tend to agree
     3      Tend to disagree
     4      Totally disagree
     5                    DK
 NA(i) Inap. (not 1 in eu28)
Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
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ausstieg klimaabkommen(Intercept)  2.886423   0.007171  402.51   <2e-16 ***
leftright   -0.077918   0.003353  -23.24   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 1.02 on 20712 degrees of freedom
  (12466 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.02542, Adjusted R-squared:  0.02537 
F-statistic: 540.1 on 1 and 20712 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
R Script
library(haven) # package to import and export SPSS, Stata and SAS files, in this case: Importing a Stata dataset
Eurobarometer_87_3 <- read_dta("~/localpath/ZA6863_v1-0-0.dta")
# defining missings
Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9[Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 == 6]<-NA # recoding DK as Missing
Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5[Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 == 5]<-NA
Eurobarometer_87_3$d1[Eurobarometer_87_3$d1 > 10]<-NA # recoding DK and Refusal as Missing
# recoding the independent variable
leftright <- Eurobarometer_87_3$d1 - 5.5 
leftright_sq <- leftright^2
extremism <- sqrt(leftright^2)-0.5
left <- leftright*-1
left[left < 0] <- NA
right <- leftright
right[right < 1] <- NA # 0.5 is not included, because it is the perceived center.
center_nom <- leftright==-0.5 | leftright==0.5
right_nom <- leftright > 1
left_nom <- leftright < -1
center_dummy <- center_nom
center_dummy[center_nom==T] <- 1
center_dummy[center_nom==F] <- 0
right_dummy <- right_nom
right_dummy[right_nom==T] <- 1
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right_dummy[right_nom==F] <- 0
left_dummy <- left_nom
left_dummy[left_nom==T] <- 1
left_dummy[left_nom==F] <- 0
# regressions
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ right_dummy + left_dummy, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))   
# center is the reference category
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ right_dummy + left_dummy, weights = 
Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ extremism , weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)) 
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ leftright_sq, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ left, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ right, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa9 ~ leftright, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ extremism , weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23)) 
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ leftright_sq, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ left, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ right, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
summary(lm(Eurobarometer_87_3$qa18a_5 ~ leftright, weights = Eurobarometer_87_3$w23))
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